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Abstract. This paper analyses the determinants of regional tax gap in Italy testing if tax evasion is 
characterised by spatial persistence. The size of spatial correlation in regional tax gaps has been test-
ed and the role of additional determinants of evasion over the period 2001–2011 has been estimated. 
Using a dynamic spatial panel model, it is shown that regional tax gap is determined by tax evasion 
in neighbouring regions and is characterised by spatial persistence. Results make it possible to draw 
a taxonomy of the determinants of regional tax gap: contextual factors and operational factors linked 
to the relative efficacy of tax evasion contrasting policies and geography. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The success of an auditing scheme and a tax payment enforcement policy by tax rev-
enue agencies depends on a wide range of factors, like for example the accountability 
and the integrity of civil servants, the feasibility of the tax rationale and the effective-
ness of the fiscal administration. Among these, the capacity to measure tax evasion 
and identify its determinants are surely of great importance to monitor the progress 
and to positively impact on tax compliance. Can geography and proximity represent 
an additional factor influencing tax evasion? Across regions of the same country, can 
the level of tax evasion be affected by the level of evasion of neighbouring regions?
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The determinants of tax evasion have been extensively analysed by previous 
and recent literature (Alm, 2012; Yitzhaky, 1974; Clotfelter, 1983; Marino and 
Zizza, 2012). Among factors of non-compliance, geography has been also added 
to the picture. It has been considered either to control for regional fixed effects 
(Richardson, 2006; Schneider and Enste, 2000) with respect to tax collection effi-
ciency or tax settings (Depalo and Messina, 2011) or in evaluation of the shadow 
economy (Williams and Windebank, 2011; Schneider and Williams, 2013). Fi-
nally, spatial adjustments have been included into a MIMIC approach to analyse 
regional differences in shadow economy in Europe (Herwartz et al ., 2015).
The aim of this paper is to explicitly address the role of geography and prox-
imity in modelling regional levels of tax gap for Italy. Our analysis is new in dif-
ferent respects. First, the attention is on tax gap rather than on shadow economy, 
since the tax gap is the most relevant aggregate of shadow economy. Second, the 
analysis is focused on Italy thank to the availability of an eleven-year panel of re-
gional tax gap estimates that allows us to explore dynamic spatial correlations and 
proximity issues in fiscal non-compliance. Third, the empirical analysis is based 
on the estimation of a spatial dynamic panel model including the share of evaded 
taxes of neighbouring regions as additional explanatory variable. 
As for the measure of non-compliance, we use the share of tax gap on potential 
tax revenues that are the sum of taxes paid and tax gap. Our dependent variable 
can be considered as a measure of tax gap propensity, i.e. how much each taxpayer 
evades for each unit of tax liability. We then estimate the size of spatial correlations 
among Italian regional tax gap propensities over the period 2001–2011, and three 
model specifications starting from a pooled OLS to a dynamic panel showing that es-
timated coefficients may be inefficient in presence of spatial correlation of residuals. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sketches some evidence 
on the geographical distribution of tax gap propensities among Italian regions. 
Section 3 provides some theoretical considerations on the role of geographical 
aspects in explaining tax gaps. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy while 
section 5 presents the data. Section 6 contains the results. Finally, Section 7 con-
cludes providing few suggestions for further research and discusses the policy 
implications of the results.
2. GEOGRAPHY AND THE TAX GAP: SOME EVIDENCE FROM 
ITALIAN REGIONS
Tax gap is used in this study as a measure of tax evasion. Tax gap is defined as the 
difference between the potential tax yield that could be collected if no taxpayers 
would voluntary cheat tax payment and the actual tax revenues. We use a panel 
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database of regional tax gaps estimated by the Italian Revenue Agency (hereafter, 
IRA)1 from 2001 to 2011. The estimation follows the ‘top-down’ approach based 
on the comparison of the declared income tax base with data from National Ac-
counts on value added, which represents the potential tax base.2 The tax gap (E) 
is then calculated as the ratio of monetary level of total tax gap3 and the potential 
amount of tax revenues (PTR), i.e. the sum of taxes actually paid and the tax gap 
itself:
E Tax Gap
PTRit
it
it
=
 
 
[2.1]
Where i indicates the region and t the tax year. The ratio in [2.1] can be seen 
as an indicator of the regional propensity of non-compliance and a proxy of tax 
evasion as it measures the amount of each monetary unit of tax gap per each unit 
of potential tax revenues: 
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Figure 1 shows the 2001–2011 distribution of regional tax gaps.4 The anal-
ysis of regional box plots representing the time-variation of tax gap shows the 
heterogeneity of the phenomenon among the Italian regions among the two ex-
tremes of Lazio (0.13)5 and Basilicata (0.47). Moreover, in some regions, like 
Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Liguria and Tuscany, the tax gap remained quite stable 
while others, like Calabria, Sardinia and Sicily experienced a large variation in 
TG values. The TG’s time variation can be due to large yearly differences either 
of potential tax revenues or of tax gap. It is also interesting to note that southern 
regions6 experienced a large dispersion of tax gap propensities index trough time. 
Figure 1 shows also very few outliers represented by some yearly observations 
1 The 20 Italian regions are defined by NUTS 2 classification level and have administrative power.
2 For a detailed description of the methodological issues of tax gap measurement, see Braiotta et al ., 
2015 and D’Agosto et al ., 2014.
3 By total tax gap we refer to the value of the evasion estimated on taxes under the duty of the IRA, 
i.e. the sum of VAT, personal income tax (namely, IRPEF), corporate income tax (namely, IRES) and 
tax on production activities (namely, IRAP).
4 Tax gap and potential tax revenues are calculated by the Italian Revenue Agency depending on 
firms’ registered address. The geographical distribution of these two measures can be different if 
calculated using the region where firms’ plants are located.
5 It should be noted that Lazio includes Rome and therefore large share of its potential tax revenues 
of are represented by public administration and central government. This sector of economic activity 
has a tax gap equal to 0.
6 Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicily.
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Year I-statistics Moran’s test (p-value)
2001 0.642 0.000
2002 0.683 0.000
2003 0.552 0.000
2004 0.510 0.000
2005 0.502 0.000
2006 0.571 0.000
2007 0.560 0.000
2008 0.523 0.000
2009 0.487 0.000
2010 0.442 0.000
2011 0.490 0.000
Fig. 1. 2001–2011 distribution of Italian regional Tax Gaps 
Source: authors’ calculation based on IRA estimates
of TG in four regions. Evidence of regional differences in tax gap shares appears 
also by comparing the 2001–2011 descriptive statistics,7 as shown in Tab. 1 and 
Fig. 2. Southern regions experience the highest incidence of tax gap on potential 
tax revenues while Lazio, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy and Friuli-Venezia Gi-
ulia are those with the lowest average propensities. Between these two extremes, 
a graduation can be observed mainly among regions in the Center Italy. Even in 
the block of southern regions, a small variation in TG share can be observed be-
tween Campania, Apulia and Sicily and Molise, Calabria and Basilicata. Descrip-
tive analysis provides a first evidence of the relevance of geography and proximity 
in explaining tax gap shares. Our empirical analysis is meant to analyse if neigh-
bourhood effects can be significant in explaining a regional share of tax gap with 
respect to potential fiscal revenues. Such descriptive geographical distributions 
suggest that a ‘region-specific’ effect and spatial correlations should be considered 
in the econometric model.
7 For each i-region we calculate the ratio between the average tax gap (period 2001–2011) and the 
average PTR (period 2001–2011) as
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Fig. 2. Regional distribution of average 2001–2011 tax gaps
Source: authors’ calculation based on IRA estimates
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Table 1. Regional Tax Gaps (E): Descriptive statistics
 Region mean sd IQR median
Abruzzo 0.331 0.079 0.068 0.293
Aosta Valley 0.299 0.040 0.064 0.319
Basilicata 0.871 0.081 0.144 0.875
Calabria 0.878 0.149 0.243 0.871
Campania 0.546 0.093 0.132 0.527
Emilia-Romagna 0.217 0.024 0.034 0.221
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.242 0.032 0.035 0.251
Lazio 0.151 0.018 0.032 0.151
Liguria 0.246 0.019 0.024 0.256
Lombardy 0.235 0.050 0.078 0.215
Marche 0.400 0.034 0.042 0.396
Molise 0.704 0.070 0.090 0.686
Piedmont 0.259 0.026 0.045 0.269
Apulia 0.604 0.113 0.180 0.609
Sardinia 0.460 0.120 0.197 0.399
Sicily 0.531 0.152 0.121 0.514
Tuscany 0.317 0.033 0.040 0.322
Trentino-South Tyrol 0.218 0.037 0.048 0.200
Umbria 0.412 0.046 0.042 0.425
Veneto 0.286 0.033 0.040 0.288
Source: authors’ calculation based on IRA estimates.
3. THE MODEL
The reference theoretical framework is the well-known model of Allingham and Sad-
mo (1972), recently extended by Alm and Yunus (2009) and Di Caro and Nicotra 
(2014) to consider also spatial aspects of tax evasion. It considers tax evasion as a re-
sult of an individual maximization choice in which the taxpayer decides how much to 
evade based on the level of his expected utility. As observed by Andreoni et al . (1998), 
this general model is not always able to predict a growing empirical evidence on the 
role of other factors, like moral sentiments, guilt and shame as well as contextual 
characteristics. An extension to the model is then proposed in order to comprise other 
variables related to socio-economic and contextual factors, and variables assessing the 
intervention of the fiscal administration into the general theoretical framework. 
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Let yit be the individual income, which is unknown to the tax authority. It 
should be underlined that average taxpayer decides where to locate production 
and consumption given business opportunities provided by a region’s economic 
system. Such decision is influenced by a set of exogenous economic and institu-
tional characteristics that will be included in the empirical analysis. Let τ
it
 be the 
constant tax rate on personal income and p
it
 the probability of being audited. If 
the taxpayer is caught cheating she/he is charged a penalty rate θ
it
 on the evaded 
income Eit . We think that the penalty rate is directly linked to the characteristics 
of the production system and the efficacy of the auditing process by the fiscal 
administration. Moreover, the average audited taxpayer faces an additional cost 
that tax morale and other sentiments (like guilt and shame) represent in individual 
choice to evade. We indicate this extra cost with δ
it
. The average taxpayer i when 
deciding how much income to evade takes into account also the amount E
jt
 evaded 
by another average taxpayer j (with j ≠ i). Individual after tax income in the state 
‘not caught cheating’ is:
Y y y Ei
AT
it it it it
1
   ( )
while, in the state ‘caught cheating’, it is: 
Y y y E Ei
AT
it it it it it it it it2
      
Each taxpayer is characterised by a von Neumann-Morgestern (1953) expected 
utility: 
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) (U p E U y y E p E U yit it jt it it it it it it jt it it i     1   t it it it it it ity E E    )
where pit(Eit) is the probability of being caught cheating conditional on the evasion 
of the average taxpayer j. The optimal level of tax evasion Eit is obtained from the 
first order conditions of the maximization problem: 
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )1
1 2
   p E U Y p E U Yit jt it i
AT
it jt it i
AT
The solution to the taxpayer’s utility maximization can be written in the gen-
eral functional form: 
E f E X Cit jt it it= ( , , )   [3.1]
where Xit represents the set of variables related to the IRA enforcement that in-
fluence the individual’s choice to evade and Cit the contextual factors describing 
the socio-economic characteristics of the environment with which the taxpayers 
interacts. This set of exogenous variables refers to those socio-economic and in-
stitutional characteristics, to the indicators of the efficacy of auditing policy and to 
moral sentiments that may drive the individual’s decision to evade taxes. 
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In this paper, the focus is on regional tax gap that depends on tax gap of the 
neighbour regions and a set of covariates. In the theoretical model we then refer to 
the average taxpayer i located in region i. Moreover, as recalled in section 2, tax eva-
sion is measured as tax gap share of potential tax revenues. Thus, in the section de-
voted to the empirical analysis, tax gap for region i in time t will be indicated by Eit .
4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS
Studying spatial correlations raises several econometric issues. First, if proximity 
affects tax gap and firms react to evading decisions of neighbour regions, then the 
choice to evade taxes is endogenous and correlated with the residual term (u). In 
fact, there can be unobserved characteristics like institutional environment and tax 
morale that can be spatially correlated among bordering regions. Second, if tax-
payers in neighbouring regions are subject to correlated random shocks, regional 
tax gaps could be correlated. If we omit the spatial dimension, the outcome of 
a model estimating the determinants of tax gap propensities could be the presence 
of spatial dependence in the residuals. 
Therefore, tax gap shares is modelled in a dynamic spatial panel framework. 
Moreover, different non-spatial and spatial model specifications are estimated to 
test the hypothesis of spatially correlated tax gaps, 
4.1. Specification 1: Pooled OLS
A preliminary pooled linear OLS analysis is performed following the specification:
E x uit it it      [4.1]
where uit is a random disturbance term of mean 0. This specification does not take 
into account the spatial error dependence. Regional tax evasion depends only on 
its own regional characteristics. Model [4.1] may provide a misleading evidence 
on determinants of tax gap. Moreover, from an econometric point of view, it can 
be mispecified and lead to inconsistent estimated coefficients. 
4.2. Specification 2: Static and dynamic panel model
The presence of heteroskedasticity in the residual component of the pooled OLS 
model and issues related to the spatial features of the dependent variable lead us 
to modify [4.1] with a specification that explicitly considers an individual (re-
gion-specific) unobserved effect in the residual component:
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E x uit it i it        [4.2]
The idiosyncratic error εit is supposed to be independent with regressors xit, 
while the individual (time-invariant regional) error component uit may be correlat-
ed with regressors. In this case, equation [4.2] becomes: 
E xit it it       [4.3]
and consistent estimates can be obtain with the estimation of a fixed effects mod-
el. If the error component is uncorrelated with explanatory variables, a random ef-
fects model should be used to estimate the [4.2]. This is estimated using the family 
of generalised least squares (GLS) estimators in order to avoid correlations across 
composite error terms (within individuals). We use a IV approach such as the GMM 
estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) to control for serial correlation of distur-
bances and when the time-lagged dependent variable is included among regressors:
E E x uit it it i it        1  [4.4]
4.3. Specification 3: Spatial panel model
Even though model [4.4] considers the time persistence, it still neglects spatial cor-
relation in the residual component. In order to examine the effect of proximity, i.e. 
time and spatial correlation, a spatial dynamic panel model should be specified. In 
the literature on spatial statistics (Anselin, 1988), the extent of cross-section corre-
lation is measured with respect to a given ‘spatial matrix’ W that is a nonnegative 
N × N matrix (where N is the number of regions) of known constants describing 
the spatial arrangement of the units in the sample. The non-zero elements of the 
matrix indicate whether two locations can be considered neighbours. As a conse-
quence, the element  w
ij
 indicates the intensity of the relationship between cross 
sectional units i and j. By convention, the diagonal elements wii are all set to zero 
to exclude self-neighbours. This weighting spatial matrix is not symmetric and is 
generally used in a row standardised form. 
The weights of the Italian regional spatial matrix (W) can be obtained calculating 
proximities using different algorithms. Among these, the most commonly used are: 
the k-nearest neighbours algorithm, the contiguity weights matrix (w
ij = 1 if regions 
i and j have a common boundary; otherwise w
ij
 = 0) and the distance-based binary 
weights matrix (w
ij
 = 1 if the distance between regions i and j is less than a threshold 
cut-off distance, otherwise w
ij
 = 0). We discarded the second due to the presence of 
islands (without common boundaries with other regions) in the sample, and the third 
since the setting of the thresholds is highly arbitrary. According to the geo-spatial 
coordinates,8 the k-nearest neighbours algorithm considers that  w
ij
 = 1 if the geo-
8 Shape files with georeferenced data of Italian data are available at this link: http://www.gadm.org/.
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graphical center of region j is one of the k nearest9 to region i, otherwise  wii = 0. The 
main weakness of this method is represented by the choice of the optimal k-number 
of neighbours. In this analysis, we set the choice of the parameter k of W matrix fol-
lowing a stepwise procedure. In the first step, after setting a range of possible values 
for k from 1 to 10, ten W matrices are constructed, one for each value of k. In the 
second step, using an iterative procedure, a Moran’s I-index is calculated for each 
W matrix. In the final step, the optimal choice is the value of k that gives a Moran’s 
index closest to the average value of those calculated in the second step. Such value 
of k is then used in the construction of the W matrix employed in the estimation. The 
w
ij
 elements of the spatial weighting matrix W are used to measure spatial correla-
tions. Matrix W is employed to calculate the Global Moran I-index (Moran, 1950):
  
I N
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[4.5]
that measures the degree of proximity, i.e. if high values of a characteristic are lo-
cated near other high values and vice-versa. It varies from -1 to 1 and its expected 
value equals –1/(N – 1) under the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation. 
The nearer the I-index to the value of 1, the stronger positive spatial autocorrela-
tion is, while high negative values signal a strong negative spatial autocorrelation. 
The presence of spatial dependence in the residuals of random and dynamic ran-
dom models makes GLS and GMM estimators inefficient. In order to overcome 
this risk, we use the SARSAR specification [4.6] originally suggested by Kelejian 
and Prucha (1999) to capture spatial interactions across units and over time. In 
structural form, the SARSAR model can be written as:
E w E w uit ij
j i
N
jt ij i
j i
N
it   
 
    
 
[4.6]
We extend the specification used by Kapoor et al . (2007) including both the 
spatial lagged dependent variable and spatial error components. We then estimate 
model [4.6] (Mutl and Pfaermayr, 2011) using a two-step procedure. First, a with-
in and a between two stage least squares coefficients are estimated. The two sets 
of corresponding residuals are then used in the spatial generalised moments esti-
mator (GM) where the moments conditions are modified accordingly.
9 The choice of the parameter k of W matrix follows a stepwise procedure. After setting a range of 
possible values for k from 1 to 10, in the first step we construct ten W matrices, one for each value 
of k . In the second step, using an iterative procedure we calculate a Moran’s I-index for each W ma-
trix. In the final step, the optimal choice is the value of k that gives a Moran’s index closest to the 
average value of those calculated in the second step. Such value of k is then used in the construction 
of the W matrix employed in the estimation.
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5. DATA
The Italian Revenue Agency (IRA) produces annual estimates of regional tax gaps 
and has a large database of indicators for internal use in taxpayers’ risk analy-
sis. We select two additional indicators from the IRA’s database that are directly 
connected to the objective of the IRA to increase tax compliance: IRA_ss and 
IRA_enforcement. The first is the ratio of the number of not congruous taxpayers 
on total taxpayers who joined the ‘studi di settore’.10 This is an auditing scheme 
employed to determine the amount of revenues and taxes that self-employed and 
small firms should pay.11 The adherence to this scheme, which in Italy is voluntary 
and not mandatory, implies the determination of the number of taxpayers that are 
congruous with its criteria.12 We use the one-year lag of IRA_ss because the effects 
of the application of this scheme are perceived by taxpayers during the following 
fiscal years. Not congruous taxpayers have a higher probability to be audited by 
the IRA. We expect a negative sign for the estimated coefficient as a higher num-
ber of not congruous taxpayers directly relates to the strength of the audit scheme 
and its capacity to detect tax gap. 
The variable IRA_enforcement is the ratio between the number of audited tax-
payers and total taxpayers. It can be considered as a proxy of the probability of 
a generic taxpayer to be audited and be used as a measure of IRA’s enforcement. 
We expect a negative coefficient: a higher probability to be audited should lower 
tax gap propensity. 
Variables Q_Agriculture and Q_Industry indicate the value added from agri-
culture and manufacturing sectors on regional total value added. Q_Self-employed 
is the regional proportion of self-employed on total employees. These variables 
have been inserted to describe the feature of the regional production sector. We 
expect a positive sign for agriculture and self-employment quotas and a negative 
sign for industry given the different sectoral incidence of tax gap on potential tax 
revenues. We insert the average number of employees by firm as a proxy of firm 
size (Size) . As the Italian production system is characterised by a high number 
of very small enterprises, we expect a negative sign for this variable. In fact, the 
bigger the firm size the less the opportunities to hide part of the value added pro-
duced. 
10 Endogeneity issues are eluded as this variable measures the ratio between not congruous taxpay-
ers and total taxpayers subjected to ‘studi di settore’, it does not refer to any amount of collectable 
and evaded taxes.
11 For details on the effects of ‘studi di settore’ audit scheme on tax compliance, see Santoro and 
Fiorio (2011).
12 Since their institution in 1993 by law n. 427, ‘studi di settore’ require that taxpayers subject to 
this audit scheme must attach to their tax return file a form containing information required in order 
to estimate their revenues. While they are obliged to fill in the form, they are not obliged to respect 
the criteria of congruity and coherence.
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The variable Crime_pc is the number of crimes (weighted by their seriousness 
assigned by the Italian penal law) committed by organised crime associations per 
every 1000 inhabitants. It has been included as a measure of social riskiness of the 
region and, in general, as a dimension of social capital. In fact, the variable does 
not exclusively include economic crimes but also, for example, murders, robber-
ies and extortions. We expect a positive sign of the coefficient because the higher 
crime rate of the region the more the opportunities to conceal production activities 
and the higher the tax gap propensity. D_Gdp is an indicator of the time-variation 
of regional GDP. It is a binary variables taking value 1 if in the t-year an increase 
of regional GDP13 occurred, 0 otherwise. It has been included as a proxy of the 
business cycle and employed in place of the actual regional GDP growth rate to 
avoid multicollinearity issues. We do not have a priori for this variable as its sign 
indicates whether tax gap propensity is pro- or counter-cyclical. 
Pos-ATM_pc is the log of the total number of points of sale terminals and ATM 
machines per resident. It can be considered as a proxy of the diffusion of the elec-
tronic money in the area. The use of Pos_ATM as a determinant of tax gap is justi-
fied by the fact that it can be connected with the use of cash in undeclared business 
operations. In fact, we can expect that the higher tax gap especially in sectors con-
nected to the use of cash (like for example, retail), the lower the transactions with 
electronic money. We expect a negative coefficient as a more spread use of trackable 
means of payment electronic money should reduce tax gap. Deposits_pc is the log 
of per capita amount of bank deposits with banks located in the region. If we think 
of per capita amount of bank deposits as an indicator of financial wealth, we can 
expect higher tax evasion the higher financial wealth. For these reasons, we can 
question about possible endogeneity issue connected to the use of this variable that 
could include tax gap. Nevertheless, the use of a panel approach allows us to avoid 
endogeneity problems. Finally, bank deposits have been inserted as they are often 
used by revenue agencies as one possible indicator to select taxpayers to be audited. 
Tax_amnesties measures the yearly amount of taxes paid by taxpayers after be-
ing qualified for the tax amnesty and shelter.14 It has been inserted in logs due to 
large disparities in regional values.15 The effect of tax amnesties on tax evasion is 
controversial (Alm et . al ., 1990). It can be negative if, for example, additional re-
sources are invested in increasing audits and enforcement after the tax write-off. It 
can be positive , especially in the long run, if they are perceived as an incentive to 
evade by taxpayers. We expect a positive sign given the hypothesis that regions with 
a higher level of taxes paid after a write-off indicate a higher incidence of tax gap.
13 At constant price, base year 2005.
14 The two main tax debt write-offs has been approved by law n. 289 of December 2002 (fiscal 
amnesty) and law n. 102 of August 2009 (tax shelter).
15 We use the log of total amount instead of per capita values as there are regions and years in which 
tax paid for amnesties is null.
19Spatial Dynamic Modelling of Tax Gap: the Case of Italy
6. RESULTS
Results of the estimation of different model specifications, diagnostics and cor-
relation tests are shown in Tab. 2. Given that estimated results are similar in 
terms of sign of the coefficients, their effect is only interpreted for the final 
specification. 
Table 2. Tax gap determinants
 Variable OLS Random Dynamic SARSAR
Intercept -0.002 0.088 0.077*
(0.074) (0.090) (0.034)
lag(TG) 0.110 0.553***
(0.084) (0.062)
lag(IRA_ss) -0.108* -0.103*** -0.120*** -0.052***
(0.044) (0.027) (0.024) (0.015)
IRA_enforcement -0.119 -0.287** -0.278 -0.233*
(0.172) (0.100) (0.162) (0.093)
Q_Agriculture 1.721*** 0.733 0.408 0.795**
(0.299) (0.671) (0.789) (0.297)
Q_Industry 0.155* -0.269* -0.471** 0.005
(0.063) (0.108) (0.170) (0.068)
Q_Self-employed 0.389*** 0.623** 0.308 0.54***
(0.112) (0.221) (0.280) (0.098)
Size -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.024 -0.046***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005)
POS-ATM_pc(log) -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.095** -0.039***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.030) (0.010)
Deposits_pc(log) -0.003 0.007 0.042 0.015
(0.020) (0.025) (0.030) (0.011)
Crime 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D_gdp -0.015* -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.011***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Tax_Amnesties(log) 0.001 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; Significance level: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5%.
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 Variable OLS Random Dynamic SARSAR
Diagnostics
Adj.R2 0.867 0.583
θ 0.824 0.683
ρ -0.688
Sargan (p-value) 0.999
Cross sectional correlation
Pesaran CD 4.423 2.801 -0.241
  (0.000) (0.005) (0.809)
Local cross sectional correlation
Pesaran CD (p) 7.101 2.642 0.009
(0.000) (0.008) (0.993)
Baltagi Song, Koh 0.709
  (0.478)
Unobserved effects
Breusch-Pagan 341.604
(0.000)
Wooldridge 3.013
(0.002)
Hausman 13 .581
 (0.257)   
Serial correlation
Baltagi and Li 33.190
(0.000)
Breusch–Godfrey 47.075 19.306 6 .171
(0.000) (0.007) (0.723)
AR (1) -3.056
(0.001)
AR (2) 0.945
  (0.172)
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
Source: authors’ calculation based on IRA estimates.
Table 2. cont.
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6.1. Specification 1: Possible factors explaining tax gap 
Even though OLS coefficients (columns 1) are mostly significant and with ex-
pected signs, they ignore the longitudinal features of the dataset. Thus, pooling 
estimation may suffer from mis-specification. Diagnostics on the residuals and the 
Breusch-Pagan and Wooldridge tests suggest that OLS estimators are inconsist-
ent, given the correlation between the residual component (uit) and the covariates. 
The variability of the individual error term with respect to total variability is very 
large (θ = 0.824). Such evidence suggests the opportunity to use an alternative 
estimator that takes into consideration the panel dimension of our data.
6.2. Specification 2: Dynamic determinants of tax gap 
The coefficients estimated using a random effects model specification are shown 
in column 2. The results of the Hausman and the Wooldridge tests are also in-
cluded. They confirm the presence of unobserved individual (regional) effects. 
The Hausman test does not allow to reject the null hypothesis of equal coeffi-
cients between FE and RE models. As in the OLS model, RE model coefficients 
have the expected sign and are highly significant. In order to check if a stat-
ic panel model is a right specification, we test the assumptions on serial and 
cross-sectional independence of disturbances, i.e. if uit is independent with uit+k, 
for k = 1,…T, and if uit is independent with uij every i ≠ j. We use the Baltagi-Li 
(Baltagi and LI, 1995) and Breusch-Goedfrey (Godfrey, 1978) tests for serial 
correlation and the Pesaran CD test (Pesaran, 2004) for cross-sectional corre-
lation. The Pesaran CD test is implemented on the residuals of model [4.2] that 
has been pre-treated as an AR structure to avoid serial correlation. Results sug-
gest that the null hypothesis of time and cross-sectional independence cannot be 
accepted. We then use a dynamic panel specification [4.4] and a GMM estimator 
à la Arellano and Bond.
Column 3 of Tab. 2 shows the results of the estimation of the [4.4]. The coeffi-
cient of the lag(TG) indicates the presence of a significant (as expected) relation-
ship between the tax gap shares at time t and t+1 and, consequently, that tax gap is 
time-persistent. The Sargan test supports our choice of the instruments included in 
the model, i.e. the lagged values of the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the co-
efficient of lagged dependent variable is significant only at 10% level. Moreover, 
given the results of AR(1), AR(2) and of the Breusch-Goedfrey and Pesaran CD 
tests, specification [4.4] still does not allow to correct serial and cross sectional 
dependence in the disturbances. These results explain the bad performance of the 
dynamic specification: due to the presence of sectional dependence the lagged de-
pendent variable is a weak instrument for the different GMM dependent variable 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
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6.3. Specification 3: Proximity as an explaining determinant of tax 
compliance
The presence of serial and cross-sectional correlation raises issues about the con-
sistency of coefficients and suggests switching to a model that explicitly considers 
the spatial dimension of data. It first is checked if spatial correlation exists using 
the values of Moran’s I-statistics calculated for Italian regional TGs for every year 
(2001‒2011) contained in Tab. 3. Results of the Moran’s test (Cliff and Ord, 1981) 
indicate that the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation between regional TGs 
cannot be accepted. A local variant of the CD test (Pesaran et al ., 2011) is also 
performed using matrix W to test the null of no cross-sectional dependence16 (Mil-
lo, 2014). Results show that cross sectional correlation of residuals of the random 
and the dynamic random models can be treated as spatial correlation. Regional 
tax gap shares are characterized by spatial persistence. As shown in Fig. 1 and 2, 
regions with high values of average TG are located near regions with equally high 
values and vice versa. 
Table 3. Spatial autocorrelation of regional tax gaps
Year I-statistics Moran’s test (p-value)
2001 0.642 0.000
2002 0.683 0.000
2003 0.552 0.000
2004 0.510 0.000
2005 0.502 0.000
2006 0.571 0.000
2007 0.560 0.000
2008 0.523 0.000
2009 0.487 0.000
2010 0.442 0.000
2011 0.490 0.000
Source: authors’ calculation
The aim of our empirical analysis is then to show that in presence of spatial 
correlation a SARSAR model should be used in order to obtain consistent estimates 
(Elhorst, 2003). This choice is also confirmed by tests of cross sectional and local 
cross sectional dependence, like the Pesaran and Baltagi (Baltagi et al., 2003) tests, 
16 The alternative is the existence of local cross-sectional dependence. Specifically, the dependence 
between neighbours only is testes on the residuals of models [4.4] and [4.6].
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and tests of serial correlation. These were performed on residuals of model [4.6] 
and results suggest that the null hypothesis of independence and no serial correla-
tion cannot be rejected. Therefore, the analysis of the estimated coefficients by the 
SARSAR model provides a correct and consistent picture of the role of geography 
and other covariates in determining regional tax gap propensities.
The coefficient of the spatial lagged dependent variable (lag(TG)17), strong-
ly significant and positive, confirms our a priori idea that tax gap is influenced 
by spatial persistence too, a result similar to Alm and Yunus (2009) for US: the 
proximity to a region with high (low) TG share is a significant determinant of the 
high (low) TG shares of a neighbouring region. The introduction of the spatial lag 
variable as additional covariate suggests that spillovers effects maybe in action 
among neighbour regions in influencing taxpayers’ attitude toward compliance. 
The lag(TG) variable exerts also a relatively high coefficient compare to other 
covariates. This means that among other factors considered, tax gaps of the neigh-
bour regions is among the strongest in influencing the level of regional tax gap. 
Moreover, it is also highly significant compared to the results of the dynamic 
panel model when using a correct model specification in presence of spatial cor-
relation. This result has surely also theoretical implications. The decision to evade 
is more complex than that described by Allingham and Sadmo model and can 
be determined also by the fiscal behavior of taxpayers in neighbouring regions.
Variables IRA_ss and IRA_enforcement are both negative and significant. As 
expected, the sign of the lagged variable measuring the share of not congruous on 
total taxpayers who joined the studi di settore auditing scheme is negatively cor-
related with regional tax gap propensities. In fact, not congruous taxpayers have 
a higher probability to be audited and their share negatively influences the power 
of the studi di settore scheme in improving tax compliance. The coefficient of 
IRA_enforcement reveals that an increase in the probability to be audited reduces 
regional tax gap propensity. This is also an expected result that indicates a positive 
effect on compliance rate of IRA activities (Alm, 1999 and Yitzhaki, 1974) and it 
is in line with results obtained for Italy by Marigliani and Pisani (2014).18 
Looking at the features of regional productive system, the higher the quota of 
regional value added produced by the agricultural sector the higher the tax gap pro-
pensity. This results are similar to those obtained by the National Statistics Institute 
(ISTAT) in estimating the underground economy.19 Irregular employees were about 
3 million (14% of total workforce) and they were concentrated mainly in the agri-
cultural sector (over 32%) (Fiorio and D’Amuri, 2006). Moreover, the coefficient 
17 For the sake of simplicity of Tab. 2, the variable lag(TG) indicates alternatively the time-lagged 
tax gap in the dynamic panel specification and spatial-lagged tax gap in the  model.
18 They use a slightly different indicator for IRA enforcement as they calculate the ratio of the amo-
unt of taxes collected by preventing and tackling evasion and total tax gap.
19 For latest estimates see ISTAT (2010) available at http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/4384.
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for Q_Agriculture is quite high compared to other variables: a one-percentage in-
crease in the share of value added produced by the agricultural sector increases the 
average regional tax gap share by almost 0.80. The coefficient of the value added 
of the industrial sector is not significant in the SARSAR specification and it also 
changes by sign, level and significance throughout model specifications. We expect 
a negative sign for this variable, i.e. the higher the value added from industrial sec-
tor the lower regional tax gap. This a priori comes from the fact that, with respect to 
the agricultural sector or self-employed and professional, industrial sector is con-
stituted by firms of medium and big size which are subject to a more complex sys-
tem of accounting and business registration that can be also easily trackable. Given 
such features of business conduct in the industrial sector, the coefficient of variable 
Q_Industry can be explained by the fact that, on average, firms belonging to the in-
dustrial sector have a lower propensity to evade. In fact, given the Italian fiscal law 
and tax procedural obligations that bigger firms must meet, opportunities to evade 
taxes are much lower than for less organised small firms and self-employed profes-
sionals. Moreover, ISTAT calculates the value added of the industrial sector by the 
region where the plant is located that can differ from the region where the firm’s 
headquarter is, which is also the region where tax gap share is imputed to. The 
coefficient for the variable Q_Self-employed is positive and highly significant. The 
magnitude of the effect on tax gap propensity is the same as lag(TG) variable: a one 
percent increase in the share of self-employed professional increases the share of 
tax gap on average by half percentage point. As in Bordignon and Zanardi (1997), 
this result reflects one of the peculiarities of the Italian productive system charac-
terised by a large proportion of small firms, professionals and self-employed in the 
total workforce. Ceteris paribus, tax evading chances are clearly larger for self-em-
ployed than for employees (Braiotta et al ., 2015).20 The firm’s size (Size) has a neg-
ative effect on regional tax gap. As stated by the Italian fiscal law, large firms are 
subjects to several additional duties and obligations in order to complete their tax 
return forms than smaller firms. Moreover, due to specific characteristics of business 
conduct21 and a higher number of controls from IRA, as firm’s dimension increases 
there is less room for tax gap.22
20 Such evidence is observed also for UK, where the tax gap from individual in self-assessment is 
17% of the tax liabilities and the same percentage for the whole taxpayers is 7% (HMRC, 2015) and 
Denmark, where the evasion rate for individual with self-reported income is equal to 37% (Klever 
et al ., 2010).
21 As stated by the Italian law, large firms are subject to a specific ‘tutoring’ activity by the IRA 
consisting in a deep and long-lasting fiscal assistance. Moreover, large firms are subject to several 
additional rules involving the spread use of electronic payment and invoicing in business conduct 
that limit the opportunities of evasion.
22 The estimates of tax gap used in this analysis refer strictly to tax evasion connected to the produc-
tion of goods and services. Hence, they do not consider tax avoidance or frauds that can increase the 
incidence of tax evasion of larger firms.
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The effect of crime is positive and significant even though not as strong as 
expected. This can be due to measurement errors or to the fact that our variable 
considers not only economic crimes but also different types of illegal activities. 
A narrower indicator could have a stronger effect on tax gap, as in the study of 
Friedman et al. (2006). Using data from 69 countries, they show how corruption is 
associated with more unofficial activity. Nonetheless, the positive and significant 
coefficient confirms the results obtained by Dell’Anno and Schneider (2006). In 
fact, if the crime variable indicate either the rate of illegality or the efficacy of the 
police action, it can also have a negative effect on tax gap, as the cost to participate 
in illegal activities increases (Eilat and Zinnes, 2000).
The binary variable capturing the time variation of regional GDP is negatively 
correlated with regional tax gap. Our results show that an expansion of regional 
GDP is negatively correlated with tax gap. This can be due to the the reduction 
of demand for underground products as GDP increases and the fact that positive 
regional GDP growth creates more job opportunities into regular economy.
The effect of the diffusion of electronic money (Pos-ATM_pc) on regional tax 
gap is negative and significant. There is a large literature and extensive evidence 
on the positive relationship between the use of cash and tax evasion. Demand for 
cash is also used for estimating the extension of tax evasion (Ardizzi et al ., 2014). 
Therefore, the use of electronic money has a detrimental effect on tax gap. 
The amount of bank deposits per resident does not affect tax gap share. If it is 
considered a proxy of the regional level of wealth, depending on the sign of the co-
efficient, it can have either a positive (cyclical) or negative (anticyclical) effect on 
tax gap. In our case, bank deposits are significant in none of model specifications 
estimated. This can be related to the way in which the variable is constructed as it 
measures those deposits with banks located in the respective region also of people 
living in other regions. Since a proportion of these deposits does not contribute to 
the regional tax gap, the variable is not significant in the SARSAR model. 
Finally, the amount of taxes paid after fiscal amnesties (Tax_amnesties) has 
a positive effect on tax gap. The increase in tax paid after a fiscal write-off increases 
tax evasion, as also in (Marigliani and Pisani, 2014). This result confirms our a prio-
ri idea that tax amnesties can implicitly represent an incentive for taxpayers to evade 
tax payment with the perspective to condone their fiscal obligations in the future.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite the wide and extensive literature on the determinants of tax evasion, the 
effect of geography and proximity has not been yet explored. Moreover, from an 
empirical point of view, the use of spatial econometrics has not been exploited in 
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the analysis of tax gap. This paper provides an original contribution to the debate 
on the determinants of Italian tax gap at regional level. Spatial econometrics and 
a SARSAR specification model have been applied to obtain consistent estimates in 
presence of spatially correlated residuals. Results support the hypothesis that, on 
average and ceteris paribus, a region’s tax gap propensity is positively determined 
by the tax gap of neighbour regions. Tax gap is then characterised by proximity and 
spatial persistence. The results of the empirical analysis enables us to distinguish 
factors correlated to the level of regional tax gap: contextual factors (the incidence 
of agriculture on regional value added, the share of self-employed professionals, 
firm size, crime, electronic money, tax amnesties and GDP growth); operational 
factors linked to the efficacy of tax evasion contrasting policies (IRA enforcement 
and renewal of auditing schemes) and proximity factors. We acknowledge that our 
results need additional research especially in the direction of testing the robustness 
of estimates at a sub-regional level. Moreover, more detailed information at indi-
vidual level could be harmful to analyse if mimicking behaviour in tax compliance 
exists among taxpayers in neighbour regions. Nevertheless, this analysis provides 
useful suggestions for tax evasion contrasting policies. At the regional level, more 
cooperation is needed among local offices of the IRA in neighbour regions as well 
as a deeper coordination among fiscal agencies, the Italian fiscal police and the 
local government. At the central level, the design of auditing schemes should con-
sider possible cooperation among taxpayers in neighbour regions and proximity as 
an additional factor in taxpayers risk analysis. Finally, given their spatial features, 
the tax evasion contrasting policies should also be targeted at production districts 
and supply chains and take into account employees’ migration across regions. 
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